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Abstract
Wage determination under asymmetric information generates ine¢ ciencies due to excess
turnover. Severance pay and layo¤ taxes can improve e¢ ciency. We show that ine¢ cient
separations can even be fully removed with xed separation taxes in the case where the
relevant private information is exponentially distributed.
1 Introduction
In a world where employer-employee matches are characterized by private information, we know
from Hall and Lazear (1984) that obtaining ex-post e¢ cient trade is fraught with problems. The
nature of the relationship creates a bilateral monopoly situation, and asymmetric information
implies that some separations may be ine¢ cient, i.e. the pair may have been better o¤ staying
together than separating.1 They investigate several wage determination schemes (predetermined
wages, or giving monopoly power to one of the sides) and nd that none completely solves the
inherent ine¢ ciencies. Nonetheless, they argue that simple wage contracts are often as desirable
as more complicated contracts which have strong informational requirements.
In this note, we show how layo¤ taxes and severance payments can alleviate these ine¢ ciencies
in a simple setup. We nd that:
 There are ine¢ cient separations.
 Appropriately set, layo¤ taxes and severance pay may reduce and even suppress ine¢ cient
separations in the case of exponential distributions of private values.
 For other distributions, there is no set of xed separation taxes that can remedy the ine¢ -
ciency problem.
Our starting point is a wage setting mechanism emphasized by Shimer (2005) in the conclusion
of his seminal paper on the volatility properties of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides
1Myerson and Satterhwaite (1983) also nd that, in their setup, ex-post e¢ ciency cannot generally be obtained
in bargaining situations with asymmetric information.
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(2000) setups. The wage setting suggested can be succinctly described as one where two negotiating
entities have private information about the surplus they obtain from given wage o¤ers. Nature
decides which side makes the o¤er. The o¤ering party then gets to make a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er,
essentially maximizing its expected net surplus, taking into account that its o¤er must leave the
other side better o¤ than its outside option.
We look at one particular aspect of the ring cost literature. Firing costs have been analyzed
along many dimensions. On the one hand, a branch of the literature takes the view (i) that they
contribute to the sclerotic labor markets observed in a number of continental European countries
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999), and (ii) that they carry high welfare costs due to misallocation of
resources [Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Alessandria and Delacroix (2008), Veracierto (2001)].
On the other hand, some other work (Alvarez and Veracierto, 2001; Fella, 2007; Wasmer, 2006)
have outlined some potential benets of ring costs when workers do not have a way to insure
their idiosyncratic labor market risk. In this note, our interest lies in whether separation taxes
which make separation more costly can reduce ine¢ ciencies due to private information.
2 The static model
2.1 Equilibrium
A match is formed between two agents - a worker and a rm, who must negotiate a wage. If
negotiations are successful, production generates output h + " where h is known to both agents
and " is a private value known by the rm only. The worker also has private valuation  from the
match. Each party has an exogenous outside option, U for the worker and V for the rm. Let w
be the negotiated wage. Thus payo¤s from agreement are (w + ; h + "   w) to the worker and
the rm respectively, while the inability to reach an agreement implies a separation and a set of
payo¤s (U ;V).
Assumption 1. The private value " is drawn from a cdf F with support ["min; "max]. The private
value  is drawn from a cdf G, with support [min; max]. The distributions F (:) and G(:) are
common information.2 We make no restriction on "max and max which can be innite, but exclude
distributions for which the support has no lower bound (for reasons that will become clear later).
Assumption 2. Nature decides which side makes the o¤er: with probability  (1   ), the rm
(worker) makes a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er w.
(For simplicity of exposition, we only consider o¤ers made by rms in the rest of the note, i.e.
 = 1. Worker o¤ers can be treated symmetrically. All our results go through with the obvious
adjustments.3)
2We assume in the note that they are twice di¤erentiable.
3 In an extended dynamic setting (Danthine, Delacroix and Wasmer, 2009), we assume that nature draws which
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Given the description of the game, the o¤ering party faces a trade-o¤ between (i) obtaining
a more favorable wage and (ii) being turned down by the other party, leaving the o¤ering party
with its outside option. Since the payo¤ from agreement is strictly monotonic in the o¤ered wage,
we anticipate a reservation strategies on both sides.
Thus, let us rst dene a reservation utility level r = r(w) for the workers idiosyncratic
component by
w + r(w) = U :
By denition, r(w) is the utility that makes workers indi¤erent between accepting and refusing
the o¤er w. Thus a wage w ensures that all workers whose private value is above (below) r(w)
accept (refuse) the o¤er. An o¤er is therefore accepted with probability G(r(w)). Recognizing
that there is no need to (i) o¤er a wage below one which would be refused for sure by all possible
types of workers, or (ii) to o¤er a wage above one which would be accepted for sure by all types
of workers, the trade-o¤ mentioned above implies that the wage w maximizes expected payo¤
G(r(w))  V + (1 G(r(w)))  (h+ "  w), or equivalently the expected net surplus
max
w
[1 G(r(w))]  (h+ "  w   V),
s.t. min  r(w)  max:
The solution to this problem can be an interior or a corner solution, depending on the rms
private value ".
The interior solution is given by
g(r(w))
1 G(r(w)) :(h+ "  w   V) = 1; (1)
and the associated conditional separation rate is S(") = G(r(w)).4
Denote by HG() = g()=(1 G()) the hazard rate function associated with the distribution
G. The rst order condition for an interior solution reects the tensions faced by the rm. By
lowering the wage o¤er, the rm increases its surplus, but also raises r(w) and the chance of a
separation. The trade-o¤ is quantied by the hazard rate: at the optimal w, the expected marginal
cost from reducing the wage - the marginal rejection probability g(r(w)) times the rm surplus
h + "   w   V, equals its expected marginal gain - the continuation rate 1   G(r(w) times the
marginal surplus gain (unity).5
Assumption 3. HG is non-decreasing.
side makes the o¤er every time a negotiation takes place. It turns out that solving for equilibrium remains simple,
as it su¢ ces to solve for the ex-ante expected payo¤ from negotiating.
4The second order condition requires that g0(r) 1 G(r)g(r) + 2g(r) > 0:
5Getting to make an o¤er may or may not be desirable: the party making the o¤er has to give up some surplus
which is informational rent to the other side. However, this is alleviated by the fact that making the o¤er a¤ords
one side the option to remove all risk of having an o¤er rejected, if doing so were very costly.
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Proposition 1 Under Assumption 3, if an interior solution for a rm wage o¤er exists: (a) it is
unique ; (b) w(") is increasing in ".
Proof. The interior solution (1) can be expressed as
HG(r):[h+ "+ r   U   V] = 1; (2)
where the dependence of r on w is implicit. Thus, h+"+r U V = [HG(r)] 1. The left-hand
side is linear in r and the right-hand side is decreasing or constant, so that there is at most one
solution and thus one wage. Also, application of the implicit function theorem shows that drd" < 0,
thus that w increases in ".
Assumption 3 is only a su¢ cient condition, satised for a wide range of distributions (uniform,
normal, exponential, etc...). The rst part of the proposition implies that equation (1) determines
a well-dened interior solution. The second part makes intuitive sense: the higher the rm idio-
syncratic productivity, the more costly it is to incur a breakdown and thus high-" rms o¤er high
wages to reduce the chance of a separation.
We also have the possibility of corner solutions. The rms problem yields a corner at r = max
when there is not enough surplus in the match to possibly make an attractive o¤er even to a worker
with the highest private utility, i.e. when h + " + max   U   V  0. We make the parametrical
assumption to rule out that trivial case.
The more interesting corner is the case where r(w) = min. That happens when a rm wants
to ensure that all workers accept the o¤er, because it itself has a high value of ".6 The corner
solution is w = U   min and the associated conditional separation rate is S(") = 0. It can be
readily veried that the corner solution prevails when HG(min)[h+ "+ min   U   V]  1.
In fact, dene the threshold b" as
HG(min):[h+ b"+ min   U   V] = 1: (3)
If b"  "min then the corner solution always prevails, while if b"  "max the interior solution always
prevails. Otherwise, b" represents a threshold above (below) which the interior (corner) solution
prevails. Given the uniqueness of the interior solution, we have a simple partition of the support
of the distribution F into two regions, separated by a unique b" dened by the value of " for which
the interior and corner solutions coincide [see eqs. (2)-(3)]. Using this threshold property, the
wage and separation rates can be simply described as(
If " < b"; w(") given by (1) and S(") = G(r(w(")));
If "  b"; w(") = U   min and S(") = 0:
Considering only the case where b"  "min so that negotiations sometimes fail, we nd that the
6This of course could not happen if min =  1.
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ex-ante turnover rate (prior to drawing ") is7
S =
Z b"
"min
G[r(w("))]dF ("):
The probability of a separation is fully determined by the productivity threshold b" . Notice that
the interpretation is di¤erent from the reservation productivity in a traditional full information
Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) framework. In MP, the reservation productivity is also su¢ cient
to compute the ex-ante probability of a separation, since it denes the level below which all matches
break down. In this setup too, all matches with "  b" do survive as rms want to make sure that
the match remains in place by o¤ering a non-negative surplus to all types of workers. Yet some
matches characterized by " < b" may survive as long as  is high enough.
2.2 The case of exponential distributions
A particularly simple solution can be obtained when HG is constant, as is the case for exponential
distributions, i.e. G() = 1   e  over [0;+1). In that case, HG() =  > 0 for all . Since
the threshold b" is such that interior and corner solutions coincide, we nd using (2)-(3) that
r[w(")] = b"  ". The negotiating game can be entirely described by the following system8>>><>>>:
b" = U + V h+  1;
w(") = U +minf0; "  b"g;
S =
Z b"
"min
G(b"  ")dF ("):
Notice that turnover increases with b" and thus decreases with h  (U + V): the more productive
the match is relative to the outside options of workers and rms, the lower turnover is since it is
more likely that " and  are drawn above the no-separation cuto¤ points.
2.3 Ine¢ cient separations
As recognized by Hall and Lazear (1984), asymmetric information setups are plagued by ine¢ cient
separations. In this section, we consider the extent of such ine¢ ciency in our framework. We
investigate possible remedies and their limitations in section 3.
Separations are e¢ cient when they take place if and only if the total surplus of the match is
negative. For sake of generality, we introduce here the notion of separation wasteand denote it
  0 (one can think of it as specic capital, which is lost to society as a whole when a separation
7Notice that worker o¤ers can be analyzed in a similar fashion. When 0 <  < 1, the ex-ante turnover rate is
given by
S = :
Z b"
"min
G[r(wf ("))]dF (") + (1  ):
Z b
min
F ["r(ww())]dG():
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occurs). Thus workers and rms separate e¢ ciently when
h+ "+    U   V <  :
On the other hand, workers and rms separate in equilibrium when  < r(w(")); or using the
wage expression found in section 2.2, when
h+ "+    U   V <  1:
Thus equilibrium may result in some ine¢ cient separations, when   < h+"+ U V <  1.
There are two sources of ine¢ ciencies. First, individual rms and workers do not take into account
the separation waste  which is costly to society as a whole. Second, some ine¢ cient separations
are due to asymmetric information. We can see that the lower , the higher the proportion of
ine¢ cient separations. Indeed, workersprivate information confer informational rent to them.
Thinking back in terms of the trade-o¤ faced by rms in making their o¤ers, as shown in section
2.1, the lower the hazard rate the less risky it is for rms to o¤er low wages. The hazard rate
of the distribution G is equal to  so that a lower value of  implies that rms are relatively
more aggressivein their wage o¤ers, leading to more separations, possibly when the match has
a positive surplus.
3 The model with separation costs
Hall and Lazear (1984) investigated several schemes aimed at alleviating these ine¢ ciencies. They
mostly focused on wage schemes, but upon a suggestion made by O. Hart also discuss the possibility
of severance payment. We follow this line of research and now introduce the possibility of taxing
separations. The idea is to make it more costly to reject an o¤er. As in section 2, we only look at
the case of rm o¤ers, but our results can be extended to o¤ers on both sides.
We denote by f (w) the penalty/subsidy to the rm (worker) when the o¤er is rejected and
do not restrict the sign of either. A separation tax is the case where f > 0 and w = 0 (or vice
versa), while a severance payment corresponds to the case f + w = 0. From a social point of
view, we consider that separation taxes are redistributed lump-sum.
3.1 Equilibrium
We can proceed as in section 2.1 to compute equilibrium. The reservation rule must now take
termination costs into account,
w + r(w) = U   w:
The rms o¤er w is then given by:
max
w
[1 G(r(w))]  (h+ "  w   V + f );
s.t. r(w)  0;
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which leads to the interior solution
w(") = h+ "  V    1 + f :
The corner solution is obtained when no worker rejects the o¤er, i.e. when r(w) = 0 or
w = U   w:
At the new threshold b" the two solutions coincide, thus
b" = U + V   h+  1   w   f :
As above, the ex-ante turnover rate S is entirely determined by b", since S = R b"
"min
G(b"  ")dF ("):
Turnover is thus reduced by both a tax on the worker and a tax on the rm. We can verify that
severance payments have no e¤ect on turnover.
3.2 Can e¢ ciency be recovered?
Any penalty being rebated lump-sum, such penalties are welfare-improving by a¤ecting allocations,
which in our case is done by ensuring that a separation takes place if and only the total surplus is
negative, i.e.
h+ "+    U   V <  :
On the other hand, workers and rms separate in equilibrium when  < r(w(")); or using the
wage expression found in section 3.1, when
h+ "+    U   V <  1   w   f :
Proposition 2 Suppose that  = 0. When w + f =  1, workers and rms separate e¢ ciently
in equilibrium.
Interestingly, the social planner can chose any combination of penalties on the worker and the
rm: in a Coasian way, there is an innite number of e¢ cient combinations of property rights.
Now suppose that separation implies a loss to society, i.e.  > 0. It follows that:
Proposition 3 Suppose that  > 0. When w + f =  +  1, workers and rms separate
e¢ ciently in equilibrium.
The loss of specic skills induces the social planner to impose a larger penalty on separations.
The remaining question is to determine whether these strong results can be generalized to
other distributions. We will nd that recovering e¢ ciency fully is only possible with exponential
distributions.
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Fix ". We know that (conditional on ",) separations taking place in equilibrium are e¢ cient if
 < e¤ where h+"+e¤  U V =  . The equilibrium (interior) rst order condition results in
separations whenever  < r where HG(r):[h+"+r U V+w+f ] = 1. By varying w+f ,
we can a¤ect the value of r in the preceding equation. To recover e¢ cient separations (still for a
given "), we need to choose taxes so that r = e¤ , i.e. HG(U + V   h  "  ):[w + f   ] = 1.
We can see that there is no hope of recovering e¢ ciency unconditionally for a general distribution,
that is with constant taxes, as the social planner would have to impose separation costs contingent
on rms productivity. The only case where we can recover e¢ ciency with constant taxes is when
the hazard rate is constant, i.e. for exponential distributions.
Nonetheless, taxes could be used to move closer to e¢ ciency by choosing non-contingent w+f
to minimize ine¢ cient separations, now taking into account the distribution of ".
4 Conclusion
In this note, we nd that an alternative game of o¤ers generate simple solutions under asymmetric
information and can be used in matching literature. Although asymmetric information leads to
ine¢ ciencies due to excess turnover, we nd that these ine¢ ciencies can be reduced in the presence
of separation costs. One conclusion is that with asymmetric information, ine¢ cient separations
can be completely removed by adequately choosing separation costs in the case of distributions
with a constant hazard rate. Otherwise, ine¢ ciencies can be alleviated by imposing separation
costs, but the ability to do so is hampered by the characteristics of the underlying distributions
of private values.
Although these results have been derived under the assumption that rms make unilaterally
a take-it-or-leave-it o¤er, results can be extended straightforwardly to o¤ers from both sides. We
conjecture that they could also be extended to a game of o¤ers and counter-o¤ers albeit at some
additional complexity cost.
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